As suggested in the section on data, analyses in Hipcheck are about computations performed on the data Hipcheck collects, with the purpose of producing measurements about that data to which policies can be applied.
In general, analyses can be grouped into two broad categories:
To understand these, it's useful to ask: what is software supply chain risk? In general, we understand software supply chain risk to be the collection of risks associated with adopting third-party software dependencies. This may include:
It's worthwhile to be precise about "weaknesses" and "vulnerabilities" in software. Both are important, but the distinction matters. To explain, we will borrow definitions from the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) programs. CWE is a program for enumerating a taxonomy of known software and hardware weakness types. CVE is a program for tracking known software vulnerabilities.
Definition of "weakness":
A 'weakness' is a condition in a software, firmware, hardware, or service component that, under certain circumstances, could contribute to the introduction of vulnerabilities. — Common Weakess Enumeration
Definition of "vulnerability":
An instance of one or more weaknesses in a Product that can be exploited, causing a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability; a set of conditions or behaviors that allows the violation of an explicit or implicit security policy. — Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures
In general, Hipcheck is not concerned with intellectual-property risks, as there exist many tools today that effectively extract licensing information for open source software, analyze those licenses for compatibility and compliance requirements, and report back to users to ensure users avoid violating the terms of licenses and meet their compliance obligations. We do not believe there's significant value for Hipcheck to re-implement these same analyses.
However, Hipcheck does care about vulnerability risk, which is what the "practice" analyses are concerned with, and about supply chain attack risk, which is the concern of the "attack" analyses.
In general, we believe that most open source software will not be the victim of supply chain attacks, at least currently. This may change in the future if open source software supply chain attacks continue to become more common. To quote the paper "Backstabber’s Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks" by Ohm, Plate, Sykosch, and Meier:
From an attacker’s point of view, package repositories represent a reliable and scalable malware distribution channel.
However, in the current landscape, users of open source software dependencies are rightfully more concerned with the risk that their dependencies will include vulnerabilities which have to be managed and responded to in the future. This is what "practice" analyses intend to assess.
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